New light on Chinese enterprises in Africa: Findings from a recent survey of Chinese firms in Kampala, the capital of Uganda by Dijk, M.P. (Meine Pieter) van & Warmerdam, W. (Ward)
 1 
New Light on Chinese enterprises in Africa: Findings from a recent 
survey of Chinese Firms in Kampala, the capital of Uganda  
Meine Pieter van Dijk and Ward Warmerdam, professor at the Maastricht 
School of Management (MSM) and PhD student at ISS of EUR respectively, 
version 16-10-2012 
MsM 60th Anniversary Global Lecture Series: China 
Can China sustain its transformation: Management challenges in a resource-
scarce and shock-prone global economy 
October 28, 2012, Nanjing University Business School, Nanjing China 
Abstract 
In this paper five issues will be analyzed. In the first place that no separation 
is made between providing Chinese aid, developing trade relations with China 
and starting investment activities in Africa. Secondly, is it true that the 
Chinese government helps Chinese entrepreneurs to get started in Africa. In 
the third place it is often suggested that Chinese entrepreneurs start after a 
Chinese aid project or construction job. Another issue is the presence of 
Chinese traders: what is the role of Chinese whole sale or retail traders in 
Africa and why are these entrepreneurs so successful? Finally we will look at 
employment and environmental issues in which Chinese entrepreneurs are 
said to be involved. 
Based on interviews of 42 Chinese enterprises in Uganda evidence is 
presented concerning what types of enterprises moved into Uganda and for 
which reason? We will analyze to what extent Chinese enterprises employ 
Chinese workers and Ugandan managers. What motivates these Chinese 
entrepreneurs to invest in Uganda and how do they deal with the challenges 
such as labour and environmental legislation? Which problems do they face? 
The relations between Uganda and China are influenced by the influx of 
Chinese enterprises in Uganda and the issues this raises. African countries 
are sensitive to the issue of Chinese companies competing with African firms. 
Many African countries question whether Chinese (small) traders are 
necessary to sell Chinese products in Africa. To what extent are 'wholesale' 
shops in Uganda in fact involved in retail business and how does Uganda 
react to this? The analysis challenges some of the generalizations concerning 
China's presence in Africa. We conclude that Uganda is becoming increasingly 
proactive in its relationship and tries to increase the contribution of Chinese 
enterprises to the Ugandan economy, while defining the terms on which 
Chinese citizens can come to work in Uganda. 
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Introduction 
Chinese entrepreneurs have increased their presence in Africa rapidly. 
According to the Ugandan journal New Vision (March 7, 2012) in the last 20 
years some 265 Chinese enterprises have started in Uganda. The Ugandan 
president Museveni claims that China has become the country's major 
investor in 2010. The article mentions 32 China-invested projects in 2009-
2010 creating more than 5500 jobs and helping with the building of roads, 
houses, hospitals and schools like elsewhere in Africa (People's Daily, 2011). 
In many publications the impression is given that Chinese investors in Africa 
do not seem to face any problems because of the supposed support they 
receive from their government and because of the fact that they are 
considered as coming from a developing country, rather than originating 
from former colonial powers. Several issues dominate the debate on the new 
presence of China in Africa. They will be listed to put our empirical 
contribution in the context of a larger debate: 
1. Jeune Afrique (24-8-2012) considers that the Chinese government 
makes no separation between aid, trade and economic relations. The weekly 
gives a number of examples of this and claims for example in a separate 
section on China-Africa that Senegalese officials discussing land transactions 
with a Chinese delegation had no idea whether they talked to government 
officials or private investors. 
2. Van Dijk (ed., 2009) concludes that the Chinese government helps 
Chinese entrepreneurs more than other countries by providing market 
information and visa and by facilitating money transfers. Preference is given 
to Chinese investments in strategically important industries for example in 
the oil and mineral sector. 
3. He also suggests that Chinese entrepreneurs often start in a rather 
unexpected way, namely at the end of a Chinese development project or a 
construction job carried out by a Chinese company.i Brautigam (2012) also 
notes that 'some workers may stay on'. 
4. The Chinese are only in Africa to build up market channels in the 
interior. They are accused of depleting the continent's resources (China-
Africa July 2012: 32).  
5. Van Dijk (2011b) suggests that Chinese enterprises are often involved 
in labor disputes and do not always respect local environmental legislation. 
6. In a period of less than 20 years over one million Chinese people have 
settled in Africa (Van Dijk, ed., 2009). To what extent does this lead to 
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conflicts (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009) and does it also make China more 
vulnerable (Van Dijk, 2011a)? 
7. Chinese products are cheap and benefit African consumers (Hamam 
and Toomel, 2010: 23)ii, but the quality of Chinese products sold in Africa is 
low. Omojola (2010: 8) claims for example that 'experts advise Uganda to 
stop work on laying fiber optic cable for its national backbone structure 
because of low quality, but the Chinese contracts won't hear of it'. 
8. Chinese entrepreneurs present their investments as win-win 
(Brautigam, 2009).iii However, to what extent are these really partnerships 
between equals and truly win-win situations? 
9. Local manufacturers targeting national markets have been hurt by 
competitive imports from emerging economies (Hamam and Toomel, 2010: 
23) 
10. Finally it is often said that African countries have no reaction to the 
Chinese penetration of their economies.  
We will use the data collected to shed new light on some of the issues that 
come up when discussing China’s presence in Africa (for example Van Dijk, 
ed., 2009). In this paper we focus on the first five issues: 
1. No separation between aid, trade and economic cooperation? 
2. The Chinese government helps Chinese entrepreneurs?  
3. Chinese entrepreneurs start after project or construction work? 
4. The presence of Chinese traders: what is the role of Chinese whole 
sale or retail traders in Uganda and why are these entrepreneurs so 
successful? 
5. Are there frequent labour relation and environmental problems 
according to the entrepreneurs interviewed? 
We also look to what extent African countries have a reaction to the Chinese 
penetration of their economies. After presenting the methodological 
approach, we present some results from a recent survey of 42 Chinese 
companies in Kampala, the capital of Uganda under the heading: what types 
of enterprises moved into Uganda, in which sectors did they invest, for which 
reason and what are the problems they are facing? After discussing the 
above mentioned issues in the light of the evidence from a survey of Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Kampala some conclusions will be drawn. 
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Methodology 
A survey was designed to cover a number of issues which can be found in the 
literature on Chinese investments in Africa (for example, Van Dijk, ed., 
2009).iv This survey concerns 42 Chinese enterprises in Kampala to shed new 
light on a number of statements concerning the presence of China in Africa, 
which are often taken as facts.v The questions asked deal with the history of 
starting the company in Uganda, its investments, turnover and work force 
and the plans for the future. We looked in particular to what extent these 
entrepreneurs receive assistance from their government and what motivated 
Chinese enterprises to invest in Uganda. Special attention is paid to the 
reason to come to Uganda, the relations with the workers and the problems 
these Chinese entrepreneurs are running into and some in depth interviews 
were held. The answers given allow us to deal with the above mentioned 
issues and to assess the benefits of the rapid increase in Chinese businesses 
in Uganda on employment and the economy (Warmerdam and Van Dijk, 
2012).  
What type of Chinese enterprises invest in Uganda and why? 
Countries tend to specialize abroad in certain activities. The Dutch are for 
example active in horticulture in Uganda, the Indians supply Uganda 
motorbikes and the Japanese sell there their second hand cars, busses and 
lorries. Chinese investments are increasing in different parts of the world and 
also show sectoral preferences in Uganda (figure 1).vi  
 
Figure 1: Sector involvement of interviewed companies 
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Are the Chinese companies active in all the sectors of the local economy? 
This involvement is part of a broader trend to diversify China's sources of 
income, to assure access to raw materials and markets for China's industrial 
products. The issue is are Chinese enterprises in Uganda to get the raw 
materials out of the country and selling Chinese products in every corner of 
the country? Figure 1 shows the activities of Chinese enterprises which we 
interviewed, allowing ten times for multiple activities. Chinese companies 
were most heavily involved in four sectors. Wholesalers accounted for 26% 
of all interviewed companies, 21% were construction companies. Companies 
engaged in import and engaged in retail and wholesale trading accounted for 
21%, and manufacturing companies for 17%. The remaining sectors each 
accounted for less than 10% (figure 1).  
SOEs dominate the construction sector with 78% of all SOEs engaged in 
construction, and 22% engaged in import. Privately owned enterprises 
(POEs) had a broader spread of sector involvement with the highest levels of 
involvement in wholesale at 37%, manufacturing at 22%, and import at 
19%. Mixed companies similarly had a broad spread of sector involvement. 
Their highest levels of engagement were in imports (accounting for 33% of 
all mixed companies), construction (17%), ICT (17%), manufacturing (17%), 
oil and gas (17%), retail (17%) and wholesale (17%). 
The relations between Uganda and China are influenced by the influx of 
Chinese enterprises in Uganda and the issues this raises (Lee, 2007: 29). 
She characterizes them as extremely complex and studied in detail the 
diplomatic relations, trade, investment, tourism, medical support and 
armaments. 
What types of enterprises moved into Uganda and for which reason? 64% of 
the entrepreneurs interviewed are fully private operators. 21% are state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and 14% of the companies have mixed ownership. 
Warmerdam and Van Dijk (2012) focus on the contributions of these Chinese 
investments to the Ugandan economy such as the number of jobs created, 
investments, turnover and training programs for Ugandan workers and 
opportunities to participate in management functions.vii  
The entrepreneurs invested in Kampala because of the expected market for 
their goods and services (90% of all interviewed companies stated that they 
were interested in the Kampala market). 74% of all interviewed companies 
were interested in the market in Uganda, while only 36% of the respondents 
expressed interest for the regional (East African) market.viii Aspirations to 
supply the regional market would be achieved by opening subsidiaries or 
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authorized dealerships in other countries or by attracting customers from 
regional markets, when coming to Kampala, which is a central location for 
countries like Southern Sudan, Eastern Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. 
Which problems do Chinese entrepreneurs face? 
Chinese entrepreneurs are facing problems depending on the nature of the 
firm, its size, sector and ownership. Problems mentioned by more than 20% 
of the interviewed companies, are: the problem of corrupt local officials (31% 
of all interviewed companies mentioning this problem); the problem of local 
bureaucracy and inefficient officials (33%); the re-valuation of the Chinese 
currency (the Yuan or RMB; 26%); the Ugandan shilling- US dollar exchange 
rate fluctuations (31%); unreliable local workforce (24%); the problem of 
local workers stealing things (24%); and the problem of getting visas for 
Chinese workers (36%).  
 
Table 1: Problems mentioned by the Chinese companies 
Problems Percentage of entrepreneurs mentioning this  
Corrupt officials      31 
Bureaucracy, inefficient officials    33 
De-valuation of RMB     26 
Shilling-Dollar exchange fluctuations   31 
Bank interest rates high         7 
Bank interest rates irregular        7 
Local workforce unreliable    24 
Prices of local goods too high    12 
Low skilled workforce     19 
Local workforce lazy         5 
Import restrictions           2 
Fierce competition      17 
Taxes too high          5 
Workers steal things     24 
Getting visas for Chinese workers   36 
Chinese workers too expensive    17 
Increasing sense that Chinese are not so welcome 12 
Unstable investment climate    14 
Unstable or incomplete water and electricity supply 10 
Not paid on time      12 
High price of local workers      2 
Poor law and order        5 
Limited market capability     12 
Don't understand local procedures     2 
Trade Unions        2 
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Lack necessary raw materials      2 
Lack financial resources       2 
Language and/or cultural barrier   10 
Negative image of China       2 
No problems       12 
 
The problem of ‘Getting visas for Chinese workers’ meant more specifically 
problems to obtain visas and work permits. Workers dissent and long 
transportation times to the work place were not mentioned as problems. A 
problem not mentioned, but clear from our study is the limited participation 
of Ugandan workers in management. Only 3% of all interviewed companies 
had between 76-100% Ugandans at the management level, and a further 3% 
of all interviewed companies had 51-75% Ugandans at the management 
level. 21% of all interviewed companies had management levels composed of 
26-50% Ugandans, while the vast majority of all interviewed companies had 
0-25% of their management level that were Ugandans. See Figure 2. 
Figure 2 Percentage of Ugandan management in Chinese companies 
 
 
 
The issues: no separation between aid, trade and investments 
The picture given is that the Chinese government negotiates on behalf of 
Chinese companies and sweetens certain economic favours by providing 
additional aid or loans on favourable terms. However, none of the enterprises 
interviewed in Kampala indicated that their entry in Uganda was part of a 
negotiated deal between the Chinese and the Ugandan government. Some 
exceptions are a fish raising developing project of which we interviewed and 
which turned out to be a POE. The management indicated that they will 
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evaluate the possibility of becoming active in the Ugandan market. Also some 
construction projects (for example the planned road from the airport to 
Kampala) will be financed under Chinese development aid. Other examples 
concern a company which entered Uganda to provide logistical equipment in 
the framework of a Chinese development project and now perceives an 
opportunity to continue independently. 
China has had relations with Uganda for 50 years. Early on China provided 
Uganda with numerous foreign aid projects. While development cooperation 
still plays a major role in China-Uganda relations, Chinese companies have 
increasingly started pursuing commercial activities in Uganda. However, only 
a quarter of the entrepreneurs we interviewed had started after a Chinese 
funded development project in Uganda, although there were differences per 
sector and size of enterprise. That quarter mainly concerned state owned 
construction enterprises and some were the result of a development project. 
The Chinese government helps Chinese entrepreneurs  
It has been argued that China has increased its presence in Africa rapidly by 
providing systematic support to potential investors (Van Dijk, ed., 2009). The 
evidence for Uganda shows that only 17.5% of the interviewed entrepreneurs 
have indicated that the government has helped them. The support came 
from the Chinese government and only 43% stated that they had also 
received assistance from the Ugandan government. In particular state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs, 44%) received assistance. Only 8% of the private owned 
enterprises (POEs) and 17% of the mixed companies received government 
assistance.  
Four types of assistance were investigated: helping with visas, helping with 
financial transactions, helping with market information and other types of 
support. What kind of support does the Chinese government provide?  In the 
first place information about investment opportunities (market information) 
and secondly facilitating money transfers. Chinese entrepreneurs have also 
access to a website of the ministry, providing information in Chinese about 
markets in African countries. Besides helping mainly state owned enterprises, 
the assistance is also limited to certain sectors such as oil, gas and other 
types of energy (Sino-hydro for example). It is not provided to Chinese 
traders, or ICT companies wanting to invest in Africa. Also the importing 
firms we interviewed did not receive any assistance from the Chinese 
government. The role of the Economic and Commercial counselor's office 
(ECCO) is important and this institution seems to have the same status as 
the Chinese Embassy. There is constant coming and going of Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Uganda (see figure 3), but only a part of them is registered 
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by the ECCO. In particular the SOEs and the mixed enterprises register with 
the ECCO. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of companies not on earlier lists of the ECCO 
An analysis of the lists of the ECCO shows that 16% of the companies that 
were on the 2012 list were not on the 2010 list, 48% on the 2012 were not 
on the 2009 list, 65% of the companies on the 2012 were not on the 2008 
and 74% of the companies on the 2012 were not on the 2007 list. Figures 
are similar for the 2010 list. 41% of the companies on the 2010 list were not 
on the 2009 list, 56% of the companies on the 2010 list were not on the 
2008 list and 74% of the companies on the 2010 list were not on the 2007 
list. For the 2009 list the differences are slightly smaller 26% of the 
companies on the 2009 were not on the 2008 list, and 59% were not on the 
2007 list. Finally, 39% of the companies on the 2008 list were not on the 
2007 list.  
The impression is that the Chinese government has a general policy favoring 
investments by Chinese enterprises in Africa, but the Chinese government 
would act rather on behalf of SOEs than for private enterprises. As will be 
shown below our interviews with traders taught us that the Chinese 
government will certainly not intervene for small traders, who may give 
China a negative image in African countries. Despite the attention given to 
them by the ECCO a large number of enterprises is not on the list or leaves 
the country at a later stage. 
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Only a small number of entrepreneurs interviewed in our sample indicate that 
they have received assistance from the government; the majority (82.5%) of 
all entrepreneurs interviewed had not received support from the Chinese or 
Ugandan government when starting in Uganda.  
It turns out, that contrary to the common opinion of many researchers and 
journalists, Chinese entrepreneurs receive very limited support from the 
government and the government does not always act on behalf of its 
enterprises, which may have their own arguments to be in Africa. We also 
found that the partnership jargon is currently hardly used by Chinese 
entrepreneurs as cover up for unequal economic relations. Only Huawei used 
the partnership jargon for its training activities undertaken jointly with 
Makarere and other universities in Uganda. Chinese enterprises do 
sometimes say they want to do something for Uganda and then embark on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) type of activities, directly related to 
their personnel and communities in which they operate. 
Chinese entrepreneurs start after a project or construction work 
It is often suggested that Chinese entrepreneurs start their business in Africa 
after a project or a first construction work, getting some of the equipment 
from the project. The Chinese government would stimulate construction 
companies to tender for infrastructural projects in Africa. It provides the 
equipment for free and allows the workers to stay in Africa after finishing the 
job. They can get the equipment, which is not shipped back to China. One 
quarter of the entrepreneurs interviewed explained that they came to Uganda 
through a Chinese development or construction project. 
The impression is often given that Chinese entrepreneurs just stay behind in 
Africa, even getting some of the building equipment from the project they 
worked for. When asked why Chinese entrepreneurs have opted for coming 
to Uganda in different ways. 83% of the interviewed companies expressed 
their interest in the market potential of Uganda, while a quarter had 
participated in a Chinese government funded project before coming. 10% of 
respondents stated that they were motivated by the friends or relatives who 
were already in Uganda to come to Uganda. 7% of respondents were 
attracted by attractive Ugandan government projects, a further 7% came for 
non-governmental projects, and a further 7% were attracted by a perception 
that Uganda had a stable, safe and secure investment climate. 2% were 
entered due to an international organization financed project and a further 
2% entered for a Ugandan government funded project. 5% of respondents 
stated that they had other motivations.  
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Why do Chinese entrepreneurs manage to build up an enterprise in Africa, 
where many European investors have not even tried it, despite Lomé, 
Cotonou and Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA)? Agreements between 
Europe and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries should have 
made it more attractive for European enterprises to invest in these countries. 
However, not much investment has been forthcoming, except for 
investments by the big enterprises such as Unilever and Philips, which do not 
need a specific policy framework. Indeed the number of Chinese enterprises 
has grown much faster; this does not mean however that the total 
investments by China in African countries are bigger than what EU countries 
or the USA are investing in Africa (Moyo, 2012). The difference is that China 
uses new companies, while a lot of the western investments are made by 
companies which have been active in Africa already for some time. 
 
We interviewed nine construction companies. These were larger companies 
and no evidence was found that they were stimulated to tender for 
infrastructural projects in Africa, other than by the 'go out policy'. They 
mentioned market potential as the major reason to go to Africa/Uganda. No 
evidence was found that they received the equipment for free. The issue of 
allowing workers to stay in Africa was not mentioned since these enterprises 
had not finished their job and intended to continue their activities in Africa 
anyway. 
Chinese are building market channels in the interior of East Africa 
An issue that has drawn a lot of attention in Africa is the activities of Chinese 
traders. Chinese businessmen move to smaller towns and even bigger 
villages to sell Chinese products, which they receive per container, while the 
Chinese government facilitates its organization. We did not interview 
entrepreneurs outside Kampala, but the enterprises in Kampala are certainly 
representative for Chinese companies in African in general and Uganda in 
particular. They certainly had organized their own supply chain without 
Chinese government assistance and were profitable because of that. 
The distinction between whole sale and retail traders is not always clear. 
Most countries in East Africa welcome Chinese whole sale traders, but do not 
want retail trade by Chinese individuals. As one member of parliament 
noticed in Kampala: 'do we need a Chinese trader to sell a banana in this 
country?'. Wholesalers provide goods which otherwise may not have been 
available, or not at the current price. However this has led to conflicts in 
Algeria, Zambia and Suriname (Van Dijk, ed., 2009). More recently similar 
conflicts have been noticed in Kenya and Malawi (New vision June 2, 2012), 
always focusing on Chinese traders involved in retail trade. Malawi has 
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decided for this reasons that no Chinese traders are allowed in the rural 
areas. The Ugandan government has developed policy instruments to deal 
with the issue. In the first place it has made clear to foreigners that Uganda 
welcomes foreign investors but will no longer provide visa to Chinese 
businessmen who have no other source of income than small trade. 
Our survey shows the difficulties faced by Chinese companies in Kampala, 
most notably the recent difficulty of Chinese traders and wholesalers to get 
work permits. It shows different sectors have been affected differently, and 
through an analysis of the investments, turnovers, work force sizes and 
employee training policies of the interviewed companies, shows the reasons 
for the Ugandan government’s tighter controls on Chinese firms in general 
and wholesalers in particular. 
Many African countries have no policies with respect to the number of 
Chinese workers or immigrants and feel you cannot say no to Chinese 
investments. In Malawi (New vision June 2, 2012) it is official policy to 
prevent Chinese to live in the rural areas. Also Uganda is making it more and 
more difficult for Chinese businessmen (in particular the smaller towns or for 
retail traders) to obtain a visa. 
In Uganda's parliament the question was asked do we need Chinese traders 
to sell Ugandan products. Officially Uganda does not allow retail traders, but 
want Chinese investors in the wholesales sector. As the inflow of Chinese 
businessmen and traders accelerated, and the imbalance in trade relations 
grew increasingly large, there was a negative reaction among the local 
Ugandans. The competition with the Chinese, especially the low-level 
wholesalers led to claims that Ugandans were unable to compete with 
Chinese, and as such Ugandans were losing their businesses. The authorities 
are now clamping down on Chinese wholesalers. Some of these seem to be 
involved in retail trading as well. The Ugandan traders point to the low 
quality of the Chinese goods and indicate how they suffer from this 
competition. The Chinese use the expression 'stealing some else his rice 
bowl' for this phenomenon. Larger trading companies also face tighter 
regulations, however. Some of them even understand and agree with the 
Ugandan government, saying that these so-called wholesalers often give 
China a bad image. The Chinese embassy says that it doesn’t approve of the 
activities of these smaller traders.  
Employment and environmental issues 
African countries are sensitive to the issue of Chinese companies dealing with 
African workers. How do the 42 interviewed Chinese enterprises deal with 
their workers and to what extent do they employ Chinese workers and 
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managers? We found a mixed picture. The 42 enterprises employ in total 
9845 workers, including 1004 Chinese employees. For all Chinese companies 
in Uganda it can be estimated that they created in total some 50,000 jobs.  
Chinese enterprises are often involved in labor issues, and operate like they 
would do at home, where they are benefitting from their local government's 
support, which are interested in creating more employment. The HRW (2012) 
reports for example that 'Zambian workers at Chinese ventures complain 
about safety, low pay and workplace conflicts which have spiraled into a 
spate of shootings. The employment figures for Uganda are given in table 2. 
Table 2 Employment figures for Uganda 
Percentage of Uganda workers Number of Chinese firms in Uganda  
76 to 100% 
51 to 75% 
26 to 50% 
7 to 25% 
55 % 
29% 
10% 
7% 
 
It is striking that almost half of the Chinese companies have less than three-
quarter of their workers from Uganda. In 17 percent of the cases less than 
half the number of workers is from the host country. The role of Ugandan 
labour depends very much on the type of companies and their ownership. 
The SOEs have a higher percentage and also the POEs score better than the 
totally private Chinese enterprises, which also tend to be smaller. 
A number of common problems concerning workers are mentioned. The 
entrepreneurs we interviewed mentioned in particular the following labour 
related issues: on the one hand the entrepreneurs we interviewed declared 
that the local workers are unreliable (meaning that they would come and go 
as they please), low skilled, with a low productivity and sometimes steal 
things. On the other hand it has become more difficult to recruit Chinese 
workers because of visa problems and because they claim higher wages than 
before. Also given the Yuan has been slowly re-valued until July 2012 this 
meant paying Chinese workers in Yuan, while earning money in Ugandan 
shilling became more and more expensive. However, even local workers are 
becoming more expensive, while many Chinese entrepreneurs have the 
feeling that Chinese people are no more welcome in Uganda. There are also 
language and cultural barriers and one entrepreneur interviewed mentioned 
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the influence of trade unions in Uganda, which have a very different role than 
trade unions in China. Finally, given the importance of training and other 
secondary benefits, designed to tie the workers to the firm vary per activity it 
should be noted that x% of the Chinese companies have developed training 
programs for their workers. 
Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa have a bad name as far as the environment 
is concerned, because they repeat abroad practices of not respecting 
environmental legislation, which are quite common in China. However, this 
delicate question was rarely answered in an affirmative way. Two reasons 
could be that the enterprises interviewed are active in the capital and 
probably better regulated, than for example the Zambian case documented 
in Van Dijk (ed., 2009; on the behaviour of directors of Chinese mining 
companies in the Copper belt). China has become more aware of the damage 
to its image of negative stories in the press about labour and environmental 
problems and has instructed its companies to comply with local regulation. 
African countries have no reaction to the Chinese penetration 
It is often noted that Africa has no reaction to the Chinese penetration of 
their economies. However, besides AfDB (et al. 2011) a report has also been 
published by the UN Office of the Special adviser on Africa (OSAA) how both 
sides could gain more from the relationship. According to Hamam and 
Toomel (2010: 23) the report suggests that African countries should adopt a 
coherent strategy and exercise greater ownership over their growing 
interactions with emerging economies. The emphasis is on tying trade to 
measures to promote Africa's development and infrastructure needs. Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) should be directed to sectors that can stimulate 
domestic investment, create jobs, spur regional economic integration and 
boost productive capacity. 
Conclusions 
We reviewed some of the issues triggered off by the presence of a large 
Chinese community in Uganda, which is very active in the business sector. 
African countries are concerned about a number of issues when foreign 
investment is discussed. This concern has also been expressed with respect 
to Chinese investments and workers in Africa. Following the order in which 
the issues analyzed in this paper were discussed, we can conclude that in 
Uganda aid, trade and economic collaboration are also not clearly separated. 
However, the Chinese government only supported a limited number of the 
companies investing in Uganda, suggesting Chinese investors often operate 
independently from aid or trade arrangements.  
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Secondly, contrary to the common opinion of many researchers and 
journalists, Chinese entrepreneurs receive very limited support from the 
government and the government does not always act on behalf of its 
enterprises, which may have their own arguments to be in Africa. We also 
found that the partnership jargon is currently hardly used by Chinese 
entrepreneurs as cover up for unequal economic relations. They do 
sometimes embark on CSR type of activities, usually directly related to the 
well being of their employees. Why are Chinese entrepreneurs so successful? 
Probably they are less demanding and willing to take more risks than many 
European or US investor.  
Concerning the third issues, we found that only a quarter of the 
entrepreneurs we interviewed had started after a Chinese funded 
development project in Uganda.  
China does build marketing channels (the fourth issue) but at the same time 
faces critique for sending too many retail traders, instead of organizing 
wholesales trade with Ugandan retailers. Many African countries question 
whether Chinese traders are necessary to sell Chinese products in Africa. To 
what extent are 'wholesale' shops in Uganda in fact involved in retail 
business and how does Uganda react to this? Many so called Chinese 
wholesale traders also sell their products one by one, competing with local 
small traders. In Malawi this has led to a lot of resentment and legislation 
banning Chinese retail traders in certain parts of the country. In Uganda the 
issue has been debated in parliament and it was decided to be stricter with 
providing visas for Chinese traders. 
African citizens are sensitive about labour relations of Chinese companies, 
our fifth issue. Chinese employ Chinese workers and managers. One, the 
Chinese enterprises compete with local firms and creating employment for 
local inhabitants is a priority for the Ugandan government. On the positive 
side, some Chinese firms have Ugandan staff in management positions, 
employ in majority Ugandan workers and have developed training programs 
for their employees. The issue are not so much Ugandan or Chinese workers, 
but rather how to improve the productivity and loyalty of the Ugandan 
workers to the Chinese firm. Chinese enterprises are often involved in 
environmental issues as well. They do like they would do at home, where 
they are benefitting of their provincial or local government's support, 
because they create employment. Like in Uganda, these local governments 
are interested in investments and employment and consider the environment 
a long term issue.  
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Finally, the increased presence of Chinese enterprises in Uganda has raised a 
number of other issues. The entrepreneurs interviewed are very clear that 
there are a number of structural problems working in Africa. In fact we 
interviewed some who have sent their Chinese workers back to China and 
are considering going back to China themselves. 
Many African countries have no policies with respect to foreign investment or 
with respect to the number of Chinese workers or immigrants and feel you 
cannot say no to Chinese investors. Some initiatives have been taken to 
come with a common reaction and were mentioned (Hamam and Toomel, 
2010). 
The analysis shows a rapidly changing situation which challenges some of the 
generalizations concerning China's presence in Africa. The journal China 
Africa has published (July 2012: 32) reports on polls concerning the opinion 
of Africans about China's presence in Africa. A survey of 24,000 African 
showed that in general they are positive about it mentioning the Chinese 
product and the impact of China on the economy. Sautman and Yan (2009) 
give the African perspectives on China-Africa links and conclude that African 
views are not nearly as negative as Western media make out and that not 
only the ruling elites are positive about these links. 
We conclude that far from being a passive player in the relationship with 
China it is noticeable that Uganda is becoming increasingly proactive in its 
relationship. Several obstacles exist to the successful tightening of 
regulations, but such rules would allow Uganda to make the most of its 
relationship with China, favoured by its president as mentioned, from 
Ugandans' point of view.  
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Notes 
                                       
i It is even suggested that these new entrepreneurs get some of the 
equipment from the project, or that construction workers receive 
construction equipment supplied freely by the Chinese government. 
ii For example the provision of generic medicines and insecticide dipped 
mosquito nets. 
iii Or, as from one Third world country to another (South-south business). 
iv The questionnaire was an interview schedule of 11 questions. 
v The Secretary of the ECCO was very helpful and provided an updated list 
for 2012 with 31 company names. 18 companies not on the ECCO list were 
also interviewed. 
vi UNCTAD (2012) provides information on Chinese investments in different 
countries, which allows a comparison. Updates of these figures can be found 
at www.unctad.org. 
vii Other benefits would be access to cheap consumer products (AfDB et al. 
2011), rising commodity prices and hence increasing government income in 
a number of African countries (AfDB et al. 2011) and helping these countries 
to invest more in the public sector (AfDB et al. 2011), improving 
infrastructure (AfDB et al. 2011), and giving more negotiating space when 
dealing with donors (AfDB et al. 2011 and Warmerdam 2012). 
viii None of the interviewed companies was interested in operating in the 
global market by locating themselves in Uganda. It should be noted that 
larger multinationals, such as Huawei, ZTE, Complant and CICC, also had 
branches in other countries in the region such as DRC, Tanzania and Kenya, 
and therefore were not interested in operating in those regional markets 
from their base in Uganda. 
